In order to facilitate dissemination of information regarding bird health in general, and raptors specifically, REF has copied the information below from the North American Falconer's Association ( NAFA) membership mailing. We thank them for staying at the leading edge of developments in this area. We will add from other sources as we are advised to help with early detection and management of this potential health concerns for birds, and especially, raptors. The main focus as of Spring 2006, is Avian Influenza, H5N1.

High Pathogenicity H5N1 Avian Influenza and Falconry

Produced by the NAFA Task Force on Avian Influenza (March, 2006)

The purpose of this article is to give NAFA members information about avian influenza and inform them of steps NAFA, in concert with international falconry organizations is taking.

In late February, 2006, President Darryl Perkins appointed a task force to address the issue. The members are:

Dr Pat Redig, DVM, PhD - Chairman

Patrick Morel - IAF President /European Liaison

Mark Williams - Canadian Liaison

Bill Johnston - IAF Liaison -

Dr. Bill Ferrier, DVM - NAFA/Conservation Committee Chairman/ DVM -

Alberto Palleroni , PhD - Harvard Ecologist -

Bob Berry - NARBA President / Breeder

Cal Sandfort - Peregrine Fund Breeding Specialist

Victor Hardaswick - Biologist / Breeder

Dr. Bill Cornatzer , MD - Physician

Roger Johnson - Quail Breeder

*Frank Bond - NAFA General Counsel *Darryl A. Perkins - NAFA President

The charge given by President Perkins was to "gather all the pertinent information and make recommendations for the best course of action."

Overview of the current situation:

Birds, especially waterfowl, are the natural host of Type A Influenza viruses (there are types A, B, & C). Types B and C are not part of the present concern. There are 144 major types of influenza A viruses and wild birds, especially waterfowl, are the natural host for all of them. Ordinarily, no disease is caused in the natural host.

The Type A influenza viruses are identified by a pair of proteins on the external surface of their capsule, the hemagluttinins and neuraminidases. There are sixteen known types of hemagluttinins (H) and 9 types of neuraminidases (N), giving 144 different combinations of H's and N's. For examples, H3N2 is a common influenza virus found in poultry, swine and humans in the U. S. The Spanish Flu epidemic of 1918 was caused by an H1N1 virus, that is still present among us, but most everyone is immune to it so it causes no disease. The current concern is with the H5N1 Virus with hemagluttinin types H5, H7, and H9 are the forms that have shown the greatest capacity to pass from birds to humans and to develop into strains capable of causing severe disease - i.e. high pathogenicity strains.

Most of the time, Type A viruses circulate in their bird hosts, waterfowl and aquatic shore birds, as low pathogenic forms - that is they pass from duck to duck and cause no disease. If a low path form is introduced into a novel host, such as a turkey or a chicken, it most often causes mild disease characterized by depression, runny noses and in a flock of layers, a decrease in egg production. In fact, in poultry influenza is known as "egg drop" syndrome.

In a few cases, when the virus is introduced into a new host and is passing from bird to bird, becoming more adapted to that host as it does, it may randomly evolve into a high pathogenic form and cause severe disease and death. This is apparently what happened in the early 1990's in China when the current H5N1, formerly a low pathogenic virus in waterfowl, became introduced into domestic chickens. It appears that it circulated in the live bird markets and small poultry operations for possibly several years before it changed into a high path form probably around 1995 or 1996. In the process of making that change, it also developed the capacity to pass from bird to human and cause disease in them also.

In a strange twist of fate, this high pathogenic (HP) H5N1 was reintroduced into wild waterfowl in northwestern China in the spring of 2005, causing a die-off in roughly 1,500 or so bar-headed geese (Anser indicus) at Qinghai lake in Western China (Nature vol 436: 191 July 2005). At the same time it was spreading rapidly throughout eastern China, Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos, causing death in thousands of chickens, some domestic ducks and several dozen people. Attempts to contain the virus resulted in the mass culling of millions of chickens. In the fall of 2005, the virus was seen spreading westward along the border of southern Russian states with Kazakhstan and by the first of the year, it was as far west as the Danube River delta in Romania. In January 2006 it popped up in domestic turkeys in Turkey and in February, it inexplicably appeared in chickens in the African nation of Nigeria. Also, there was an isolated incident in Saudi Arabia wherein a Saker falcon in a veterinary hospital died of H5N1 and several others in contact were euthanized, resulting in the loss of 37 falcons. The most westward human deaths were those of three family members in Turkey. In late February, several dead mute swans were found in various places in Europe, setting off mass culls of domestic poultry in a so-called 1 kilometer cull zone around any area where a bird with confirmed H5N1 virus was found. By the end of February, H5N1 was in Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and the Balkan states. Though reactions vary from country to country, in most places it has been required that all outdoor poultry be brought under cover and import/ export restrictions were placed on poultry and other birds. It remains to be seen what the duration of any of these limitations will be and that won't be known until more is known about this virus.

From the early westward movements of the virus out of China, migratory birds were incriminated as a vehicle. However, the movement of the virus has been in more of an east-west direction than one following the known migratory bird pathways. Further the movement was occurring at a time of year when migratory birds were not. It is possible that regional movements of some carrier species, such as the mute swan or the migratory whooper swan could account for some of the introductions. However, the distances that the virus traveled were vast, and except for swans, there were no mass die-offs of waterfowl being reported anywhere (One opinion on this pattern of events suggested that swans were being affected because as grazers, they may be feeding on manure from commercial poultry operations spread on farm fields, and in so doing, become exposed to the virus). Additionally, most outbreaks in widely separated areas repeatedly turned up in poultry, begging the question as to what role movements of poultry in commercial trade and the exchange of fighting cocks were playing in the spread.

HP H5N1 Influenza in North America

It is regarded as inevitable at this point that HP H5N1 will arrive in North America. When and where will depend on the route of introduction. If by migratory birds, it is believed that species such as tundra swans, pintail ducks, and sandhill cranes, among 26 species of birds known to cross over from North America into Siberia, could introduce it into Alaska. From there it could spread through any of the flyways and be distributed throughout the continent. On the other hand, given the trade, some of it illegal, in uncooked poultry products that occurs between the U.S. and SE Asia, as well as birds of various types in unregulated live bird markets, it could just as well be introduced through trade routes. Within the next few months and continuing indefinitely, a great deal of surveillance in wild birds and in live bird markets will be implemented, some of it ongoing already for several years, to attempt to detect the introduction of the virus. The USDA and USFWS will expend $7.4 million in Alaska in 2006 alone for surveillance. Despite all of this surveillance aimed at detecting introduction, it is most likely that detection will occur as a consequence of a die-off of waterfowl someplace. Either way, information networks are in place and it will be known almost immediately.

Vaccines?

A high-tech recombinant vaccine for birds against avian flu, that is under development by Fort Dodge, is scheduled for testing in zoo collections in the near future. This work is being coordinated by the Association of Zoos and Aquaria. We will keep abreast of progress in this work as well as any other vaccine developments and pass this information to the falconry community as it becomes available.

Falconers and HP H5N1

Despite the uncertainties of where and when the virus will show up, it is important for falconers to prepare for the day that it does. This preparation needs to necessarily include an understanding of the risks posed to one's birds, both direct and indirect. Risk of infection occurs in exposure from captured prey, from food sources, and from contamination. The virus is very hardy and travels well on vehicles, clothing and utensils. Biosecurity as it applies to falconry will have to be defined, and matters such as taking and handling of prey likely to be infected, quarantining falcons that have taken species at risk of carrying HP H5N1, protection of quail supplies from infection, the possibility of vaccination of raptors (currently, there is no specific vaccine for HP H5N1 - where vaccines are being used in poultry, it is controversial and typically utilizes one made for use against H5N2, a close relative. However the vaccine has not been tested for efficacy against HP H5N1 and there is a very real risk that it will allow the virus to circulate undetected at a subclinical level), limiting visitors and using disinfectants and foot baths will have to be considered. The indirect risks are largely associated with the response of regulatory officialdom. There are ongoing discussions between them and entities such as zoos and outdoor range-rearing poultry operations to establish guidelines for the response. We will be informed of these as material valuable to us will be contained in those discussions. We will seek to provide a basis of understanding with regulatory agencies that would provide protection for the raptors of falconers seen to be operating in a "best practices" manner, which will have to be defined. The major concern is indiscriminate culling. Currently, a 1 km cull zone is established around any site of an outbreak in poultry and all birds in that zone may be targeted. The third risk lies in the public and media response that arises from a confirmed detection of the virus and the collateral damage that may arise from that, a facet which may lie outside our scope.

These and many other related issues will be thoroughly investigated by this task force. Information and recommendations will be formulated and passed to the falconry community. In the meantime, it is important to remember that the focus is on the HP H5N1 influenza virus only. There are many other influenza types around and anyone who has been duck hawking has been exposing themselves and their birds to these viruses for as long as they've been hawking, including low path H5N1. Until HP H5N1 shows up, nothing has changed. When it does, everything will be impacted.

As the task force engages in its work, information will be passed to falconers in the manner most appropriate for the circumstances. This will include direct broadcast e-mail messages as well as information posted on the NAFA web-site. There are several up-to-the-minute sources of information that falconers can access on the internet to stay abreast of the most current information about the occurrence of H5N1 and some of the responses to its activity. They are listed as follows:

Additional Resources

Recombinomics- One of the largest, fastest, most-up-to date sites on the net for developments related to H5N1

http://www.pandemicflu.gov/ - One stop access to U.S. Government avian and pandemic flu information. Managed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/npip/ - web site for national poultry improvement plan - gives information about biosecurity for avian species and provides a registry of poultry producers that are registered in this plan.

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/birdbiosecurity/hpai.html - guidelines for providing biosecurity for poultry, some of which is applicable to falconer's birds.

Promed (subscribe at: majordomo@promedmail.org) - this site provides updates, multiple times daily, on the latest reports regarding avian influenza and many other diseases of human and animal concern.

World Animal Health Organization (OIE - http://www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm). Provides up-to-date information on animal diseases on a regular basis. A good source of information on meetings, information exchanges, and policy development for combating animal diseases. Much information about HP H5N1.

*The NAFA President and General Counsel are de facto members of all NAFA committees.

Regards,

Darryl A. Perkins
NAFA President
14 Union Street
Blackstone, MA 01504-1111
(508) 883-5524 Hme
(828) 238-1994 Cell

Health Alerts & Bulletins

HP H5N1 Influenza in North America

Falconers and HP H5N1